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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years there has been an increasing recognition internationally that health 
care is not as safe as it could be and that patient safety outcomes can be improved. Patient 
safety is the freedom from accidental injury due to medical care or from medical error. The 
study of patient safety issues and interventions based on these studies is the process which 
allows an organization makes patient care safer.  
Patient safety is central to quality health care as reflected in the Hippocratic Oath: 
“I will prescribe regimes for the good of my patient according to my ability and my 
judgment and never do harm to anyone…In every house whenever I come I will enter only 
for the good of my patient” (Excerpt from the Hippocratic Oath) The Hippocratic Oath 
guided doctors to do non-maleficience, beneficience, and justice for a long time. After 
establishing quality improvement practices patient safety science has been growing and 
searching for solutions, while describing methods to make patient care better. To reduce 
patient harm professional rules need to be simplified, and there is a need for system level 
arbitration to optimize safety and develop a culture of safety.  
The Institute of Medicine formulated the dimensions of quality in healthcare as: 1) 
safe, free from harm; 2) patient-centered, organized around patient needs; 3) effective, use 
of evidence –based therapies; 4) efficient, eliminates waste; 5) equitable, quality is not 
influenced by race, gender, or religion; and, 6) timely, care is provided when needed.  
In theory, quality and safety should not be a problem since medical professionals 
are educated and trained by the best to be proficient and error-free in their work. There is 
an expectation that health professionals are not likely to make mistakes. But human error is 
ubiquitous, and health care workers are not immune from the human proclivity for making 
errors. The 1999 Institute of Medicine report “To Err is Human” is the first public 
tabulation of the extent of patient harm and safety in healthcare setting. New concepts of 
human error were suggested to the healthcare industry based on the experiences in other 
high hazard industries, especially those from the aviation. A systematic approach based on 
proactive strategies involving the reporting of errors and adverse events was 
recommended, together with an admonition to identify and control latent conditions. 
Reason introduced the term latent conditions, referring to unsafe conditions which can 
exist unnoticed until an active failure happens. The relation of latent conditions and active 
failure is illustrated by Reason with a Swiss cheese model. 
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Figure 1 Swiss cheese model of defences by Reason 
 
There is an increasing belief that an institution’s ability to avoid patient harm will 
be realized when it engenders a culture of safety among its staff. The Institute of Medicine 
report, “Crossing the Quality Chasm” highlighted the need for improving patient safety, 
noting that patient safety emerges from systems that incorporate an understanding of 
human factors and safe design.  
Culture can be defined as the collection of individual and group values, attitudes, 
and practices that guide the behavior of group members. Characteristics of a strong safety 
culture include a commitment of the leadership to discuss and learn from errors, 
communications founded on mutual trust and respect, shared perceptions of the importance 
of safety, encouraging and practicing teamwork, and incorporating non-punitive systems 
for reporting and analyzing adverse events. A culture of safety is the outcome that 
organizations reach through a strong commitment to acquiring necessary data and taking 
proactive steps to reduce the probability of errors and the severity of those that occur.  
Cardiac surgery is a well established laboratory to study the outcomes of high risk 
patients and their provider teams. Cardiac surgery is a field in which performance and 
outcomes depend on complex individual, technical, and organizational factors and their 
interactions. The providers are highly trained, patients are high-risk, the procedures have a 
low error tolerance, and success requires a sophisticated organizational structure.  
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2. AIMS OF THE STUDY 
 
To explore the cardiac surgery team members’ attitudes, perceptions related to 
patient safety, and the impact of human factors and medical errors: 
• Define a measurement of safety climate, define the dimensions (safety attitudes and 
impact of error), and factors (team climate, safety climate, stress recognition, 
impact of error, error management, risk modification, error burden on operating 
room staff) and validate a safety attitude survey. 
• Explore team members’ safety culture characteristics and safety attitudes in 
different cultural settings. Since we wanted to know whether, and to what extent, 
the characteristics and traits of the safety culture are generalizable, we choose to 
perform the study on two sites. The first was in the United States, which clearly has 
a well established quality management processes and carefully designed patient 
safety initiatives. Hungarian teams were studied as the second site, where 
healthcare service is at the beginning of a transformation. In Hungary quality 
assurance programs have been under development since 1997, including standards 
for accreditation, but hospitals do not suffer any consequences for not cooperating. 
• Decide whether the main characteristics of the safety culture can be defined, 
explored with this survey tool, as: 
− Commitment to discuss and learn from errors, team work, and 
communication  
− Recognition of the inevitability of error 
− Proactive identification of latent threats 
− Incorporating nonpunitive systems for reporting and analyzing adverse 
events  
• Determine whether this tool is useful to highlight safety improvement activities for 
organizational change. 
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3. METHODS 
Questionnaire 
Since safety culture survey results based on pre-formulated questions might lead 
respondents in particular directions, we choose a more complex and established 
methodology to increase study validity. The primary instrument we used was based on 
studies of the aviation experience. This experience was translated into terms and concepts 
appropriate for medicine by a University of Texas group and an error reporting system was 
developed to measure safety attitudes (Safety Attitude Questionnaire operating room 
version). Scaled questions were taken from this validated study to explore areas of known 
importance described in the safety culture literature. In addition, new areas were described 
and scaled questions were formulated based on the clinical experience of our research team 
members. The complete questionnaire included two separate domains. The first domain, 
Safety Attitude, represents caregiver attitudes on the scales of teamwork climate, safety 
climate, and stress recognition. The second domain, Impact of Error, relates to the 
organizational and personal burdens that are direct consequences of the making and the 
anticipation of making clinical errors. Respondents indicated the extent to which they 
agreed with each statement on a 4-point Likert scale consisting of “disagree strongly”, 
”disagree slightly”, “agree slightly”, or “agree strongly.” Respondents were expected to 
formulate agreement or disagreement with no neutral answer. Respondents were allowed, 
however, to select “don’t know” as a possible answer.  
A clinical scenario and a set of open-ended questions were added to the scaled 
questions to increase the validity and interpretability of the study.  
 
Design and study population 
Cardiac surgery teams from three urban academic health centers in the USA and 
four in Hungary agreed to participate in this study. IRB approval was obtained from each 
institution, and written informed consent was obtained from participating team members.  
 
Statistical analysis 
Items in each domain were submitted for an exploratory factor analysis. A 
confirmatory factor analysis was performed on each domain to measure the adequacy of 
final structure. The scalibility of the factor structure was evaluated, and the discriminant 
validity of the scales was evaluated by computing the correlation of each retained item 
with all scales within its domain. SAS® statistical package was used. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
We studied surgery teams working in a high stress environment to assess attitudes 
and perceptions of team members toward patient safety.  
We found that safety attitude questionnaire is a valuable tool to analyze a baseline 
safety culture and raise problems of system design which need to be solved. 
 
Comparisons of the questionnaire results in the USA and Hungarian study groups 
Comparison results were divided in three categories based on the significance 
level. Answers were as “Similar” for p>0.05, “Somewhat Different” for 0.01≤p≤0.05, and 
“Clearly Different” for p<0.01. 
In the Team Climate factor in the Safety Attitude Domain there is a clear difference 
between groups on four items. Significantly more of the Hungarian cohort report that they 
find it difficult to speak up and are unable to express disagreement. Also the Hungarians 
feel more strongly that the surgeons, anesthetists, and perfusionists do not maintain open 
communications. The groups are somewhat different on whether it is easy for the staff to 
ask questions when there is something they don’t understand, with the Hungarian cohort in 
higher agreement. All of the other items in this factor are similar between the groups. 
Overall, it appears that the Hungarian teams find it more difficult to express disagreements 
but easier to ask questions. 
In the Safety Climate factor of the Safety Attitude domain there is only one item on 
which there is clear disagreement. Significantly more of the Hungarians feel that nurses 
should not question attending than do their USA counterparts (80% to 5%). There are three 
items on which there is somewhat of a disagreement. These are on whether interruptions 
affect patient safety, whether the OR culture makes it easy to learn from the mistakes of 
others, and whether attending should always be in charge. The Hungarian cohort is in 
higher agreement on all three of these items than the USA cohort. All of the other items 
show similar responses. These responses seem to indicate a somewhat higher importance 
of the hierarchical structure to the Hungarian team members. 
In the Stress Recognition factor in the Safety Attitude Domain all item responses 
are very close to each other between the USA and Hungary. All professional groups 
perceive high workloads, and when it becomes excessive they feel their performance 
impaired. From 75% to 80% agree that fatigue and excessive workloads impairs 
performance and about 50% believe that stress from personal life adversely affects 
   7 
performance. These opinions are as to be expected and seem to lend validity to the 
responses. 
In the Error Management factor of the Impact of Error Domain, six of the 1 items 
showed complete disagreement. Two of these referred to have and using a formal reporting 
system, which can be discounted as explained above. Of the remaining four items, three 
concerned information exchange about concerns with patient safety. In each of these items 
the Hungarian cohort had substantially lower responses than the USA group. The fourth 
item was on whether the lack of continuity of care adversely affects patient safety. Among 
the USA contingent 93% agreed that it did, while only 49% of the Hungarian respondents 
agreed. Only one item showed somewhat of a disagreement. This item concerned whether 
the staffing levels are sufficient. More of the Hungarians thought so (1% to 31%). In the 
area of Error Management, it appears that the Hungarian teams think that communications 
concerning patient safety are more lacking in their environment than do the teams from the 
USA. 
In the Risk Modification factor of the Impact of Error Domain, there are two items 
which show completely different responses. One of these is that the respondent is afraid to 
reports for fear of punishment or loss of job, with 95% of the Hungarian team agreeing, 
while only 12% of the USA team did so. There are two items which show somewhat of an 
agreement. These are the feeling of safety in one’s own OR and the feeling that errors due 
to lack of skill are rare. The Hungarians are in higher agreement on these two issues. All 
other items show similar responses. It would seem that although the atmosphere may seem 
more authoritarian in Hungary, the morale and respect for colleagues’ skills might be 
higher. 
In the Error Burden factor of the Impact of Error Domain, seven of the nine items 
indicate complete disagreement. Important among these is that the vast majority (31%) of 
Hungarian teams deny that they have either seen or committed errors while 92% say that 
OR personnel often disregard guidelines and 79% say that the same mistakes occur again 
and again. It may be that the respondents were making a distinction between “errors that 
can cause harm” and “mistakes”, or there may be other underlying reasons for this seeming 
dichotomy. 
 
Fictitious case of adverse event 
The responses to the questions related to the clinical scenario were uniformly 
positive. Nearly all of the respondents agreed on the need to report the medication error 
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and on the need to discuss the error with colleagues, patient, or family. The five items 
relating to the reporting of error were summed to indicate the likelihood that the 
respondent would report the error. Nearly all of the respondents agreed on the need to 
report the medication error and to discuss the error with colleagues, but in Hungary only 
11% of the respondents would tell it to the patient or family. 
 
Open ended questions 
Respondents were further asked to list any concerns that interfered with their sleep. 
The responses were collated into four categories, with multiple responses for some 
respondents (Table 1). Sleep problems were noted in all specialties at each of the 
participating institutions, and the most frequently reported concern related to provider 
competency and clinical skills.  
Table 1 Concerns Affecting Sleep Patterns 
 USA H 
 Respondents 
N=37(60%) 
Worries 
N=65 
Respondents 
N=63 (72%) 
Worries 
N=93 
1. Fear of making an error or not giving the best care e.g.: 
"forgetting to do something"; "making an error in clinical 
judgment that adversely affects patient health"; "we left 
the sponge in the patient" 
30 (46%) 17 (18%) 
2. Highly complex cases, patient outcome e.g.: "exact 
management of the complex critically ill patient"; "patient 
outcome" 
11 (17%) 24 (26%) 
3. Hectic schedule, heavy caseload e.g.: "unfair/unrealistic 
work assignments" 
11 (17%) 21 (23%) 
4. Other team members performance, stress during work, 
external factors e.g.: "too much stress at work"; "declining 
caseload"; "unprofessional behavior by others" 
13 (20%) 31(33%) 
 
In Hungary 72% and in the USA 65% of the respondents reported having difficulty 
sleeping because of job-related concerns (Table 1). In the USA study the leading cause of 
provider worries were fears related to their performance inadequacy, 46% worry about 
making error, closely followed by concerns over the complexity of the tasks faced (17%). 
17% formulated problems with “unrealistic work assignments”. Responses to this 
questions correlate with scaled question when more than 70% of the respondents feel that 
excessive workload and fatigue adversely affects their performance. The Hungarian study 
group at this point is less concerned about making an error (18%). They worry more about 
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the complexity of the cases (26%), the hectic schedule (23%), and worry the most about 
other team members’ behavior, performance and stress during their work (33%).  
Respondents were also asked to list three frequently occurring errors they had 
personally observed (Table 2). The reported errors were categorized by the type of error. 
In the USA study group the most frequent type was a medication error, miscommunication 
were also frequent. Equipment problems, not following clinical guidelines were less 
frequent. The observed errors by Hungarian study group were categorized by the same 
types but they do not detect as many medical errors (10%), and communication problems 
(7%). Most of the problems reported were related to standards are not followed, which is 
correlate with the finding that 92% responded that OR personnel often disregard rules and 
guidelines. As indicated above, the responses of the Hungarian teams may be making a 
distinction between errors with the potential to cause harm and simple “mistakes.” 
 
Table 2 Frequently Occurring Errors Observed by Respondents 
 
USA H 
  
Type of Error Number of Errors Reported  
N=123 
Respondents N=50 
Number of Errors Reported  
N=124 
Respondents N=60 
1. Medication error 42 (34%) 13 (10%) 
2. Equipment problems and misuse 28 (23%) 19 (15%) 
3. Communication problem 28 (23%) 9 (7%) 
4. Clinical standards are not followed 25 (20%) 83 (67%) 
 
Finally, the respondents were asked to list up to three recommendations for 
improving patient safety. Fifty-one respondents articulated 130 recommendations and in 
the Hungarian study group 57 respondents listed 140 recommendations to improve patient 
safety. These included improving communications (USA 22% - H 15%), the need to 
follow and enforce clinical protocols (USA 21% - H 23%), appropriate staffing (USA 
10%- H 19%), provide proper functioning equipment (USA 13% - H 14%), more 
education and training (USA 14% - H 14%), and better scheduling (USA 4%- H 5%). Both 
groups mentioned that they would like learn from mistakes, requested debriefing (USA 7% 
- H 6%), and wanted a calm respectful work environment (USA 7% - H 3%).  
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
How much team members value patient safety? 
On a positive note, we found that most team members value safety concerns and 
have an increasing awareness about these issues. But it is clearly demonstrated that in the 
USA, where the request for healthcare providers serve the patient is much stronger than in 
Hungary and quality and performance controls have longer and stronger traditions, team 
members’ responses are closer to the desired culture. Among USA team members there 
was nearly unanimous support for the statement when errors are committed patient safety 
is important regardless of the patient outcome. This finding is confirmed by the responses 
to clinical scenario where nearly all responded in a way indicative of a concern for safety. 
This points out to the growing awareness to the need to report and learn from near miss 
opportunities. In contrast in Hungary only 14% thinks that committed errors are important 
in all circumstances, and eighty-six percent believes that a committed error is not 
important as long as the patient improves. The Hungarian responses reflect a possibly 
unacceptable level of awareness of error problems, and show we are at the beginning of 
this paradigm change about quality and safety. The error reporting scenario shows that 
most Hungarian team members do not support informing the patient or family about errors. 
However among the recommendations to improve patient safety no differences were found 
between USA and H team members. Both requested more briefing, debriefing, willingness 
to learn from errors. 
 
Safety attitude of team members 
Safety Climate we do expect the environment most likely to safe with open 
communication channels, well received questions from juniors and nurses if they do not 
understand something or perceiving a problem, and disagreements need to be solved.  
The item responses in the Safety Attitude domain are perplexing. The teamwork climate 
was characterized as having open channels of communication –less open in Hungary-, but 
a substantial portion of the team feels that they are unable to express disagreement, and 
professional disagreements are not resolved. Only a small percentage of our respondents 
feel that it is easy to learn from their own mistakes, suggesting that many don’t have the 
knowledge or the tools to analyze the causes of these errors. A troubling finding from the 
Teamwork Climate items is that 55-45% of respondents agreed that morale is low in their 
OR. Hungarians believe more strongly that attending surgeon should be formally in charge 
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of the OR, and a nurse should not question an attending. They report that they can ask 
questions if they don’t understand something but not if they perceive a problem with 
patient care. These answers suggest that the old fashioned model, medical hierarchy, the 
person model is not replaced with the system model yet. 
 
Human factors design reported by team members 
Many of the errors and adverse events reported in both study sites relate to the need 
to address the human factors underlying these events. The fact that only 64% of the USA 
respondents would feel safe as a patient in their own operating room raises concerns and 
suggests that important underlying elements of a safe climate are perceived to be missing. 
This study demonstrated that team members perceive a high level of workload and more 
than 70% of the USA respondents feel that excessive workload and fatigue adversely 
affects their performance, which is of concern in a frequently high-risk context of cardiac 
surgery. Perhaps a lack of education on this issue can be the reason that in Hungary only 
40% of team members realize the dangers of fatigue, workload, and stress.  
 
Error perception, error burden 
Perhaps the most troubling finding is the fact that respondents have seen the same 
mistakes occur repeatedly. The USA cardiac surgery team members perceive human error, 
both their own and that of others, to be ubiquitous. Respondents indicate that they know 
the proper channels to report patient safety concerns but often do not report these events. 
The H responses answers show that the system approach of error management has not yet 
been earned or taught. Interestingly about 90% sees the same mistake occur every day and 
report that operating room personnel often disregard rules and guidelines. Not having a 
hospital reporting system would seem to have slowed down the necessary change in 
healthcare organizations. This points out to a real failure of current systems to prevent 
errors from occurring again.  
The recommendations to improve patient safety point to clear intervention 
opportunities, and interestingly USA and H team members share the same thoughts. They 
do want frequent team briefings before and after procedures, especially if the procedures 
included patient harm.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Healthcare providers pledge to practice medicine at its best according to the 
tradition of the Hippocratic Oath. There is no doubt that the healthcare service leaders and 
providers are fighting to find a way to improve quality and reduce possible patient harm. 
The pledge, the intention to do everything according to the beneficence and non-
malpractice needs to be constantly shown. Patient safety science defines methods to get the 
desired results. To be able to apply our results about improved safety, the culture of blame 
and shame needs to change to a culture which includes system thinking. The 
characteristics of safety culture are seen more and more in the medicine. Our research 
explored the characteristics of the safety culture of operating room teams and confirms that 
bringing patient safety to the forefront of quality improvement work can help fulfill the 
promise to do no harm to patients.  
 
• We used and validated a safety culture survey tool, derived from the Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire.  
• The research explored same safety culture factors in the USA and in Hungary where 
economy is in transition. 
• In both sites there is a commitment to discuss and learn from errors, and to learn from 
them. The recognition of the inevitability of the error is clearly stronger in the USA.  
• The results from our safety attitude questionnaire can help identify learning 
opportunities through highlighting areas in need of improvement and developing 
strategies in which units can learn best practices from each other.  
 
In conclusion, the findings suggest that cardiac surgery teams face significant 
barriers in enabling the conditions for safe outcomes. The perceived powerlessness of team 
members to prevent safety events must be addressed as part of an overall strategy to 
improve patient care outcomes. The study suggests that team members’ safety attitude is 
related to actual level of patient safety, recommends the use of validated culture survey 
and highlights opportunities for safety improvement in the context of cardiac surgery 
teams.  However, as Jeffrey R. Immelt, the Chief Executive Officer of General Electric 
pointed out: “It takes a decade to build the talent, culture, and tools, and to learn from our 
mistakes.”[61]  
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